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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/062,799	01/31/2002	Valene Skerpac		3395
Francis C. Hand	7590 07/13/201 d. Esa.	EXAMINER		
c/o Carella, Byme, Bain, Gilfillan, Cecchi, Stewart & Olstein 6 Becker Farm Road			DAVIS, ZACHARY A	
			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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			07/13/2011	PAPER

## Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/062,799	SKERPAC, VALENE		
Examiner	Art Unit		
Zachary A. Davis	2492		

	Zacitally A. Davis	2492	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>23 June 2011</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APP	LICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.	
1.  The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on this application, applicant must timely file one of the follow places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Not a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance time periods:	ving replies: (1) an amendment, af ice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	fidavit, or other evider compliance with 37 C	ce, which FR 41.31; or (3)
a) The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 70	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailir b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN TH	g date of the final rejecti	on.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply orig than three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The appropr jinally set in the final Offi	ate extension fee ce action; or (2) as
<ol> <li>The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed AMENDMENTS</li> </ol>	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of th	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to			ecause
(a) They raise new issues that would require further con		TE below);	
<ul> <li>(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE belown)</li> <li>(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or</li> </ul>	•	educing or simplifying	the issues for
(d) $\square$ They present additional claims without canceling a $lpha$	corresponding number of finally re	jected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).			
<ul> <li>The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12</li> <li>Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):</li> </ul>	·		
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be al non-allowable claim(s).	·	·	-
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is proved the status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:		ill be entered and an e	explanation of
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, bu because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).</li> </ol>			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appe	al and/or appellant fa	ls to provide a
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	n of the status of the claims after e	entry is below or attach	ned.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered bu See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application i	n condition for allowa	nce because:
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
13.  Other:			
	/Zachary A Davis/ Primary Examiner, Art U	Init 2492	

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicant's arguments are not persuasive.

Regarding the rejection of Claims 1, 2, 4-8, 11, 14, and 16-18 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hattori, US Patent 6094632, in view of Higgins et al, "Speaker Verification Using Randomized Phrase Prompting", and with specific reference to independent Claim 1, in response to applicant's arguments against the references individually (pages 1-2 of the present response), one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). More specifically, Applicant separately argues that Hattori does not disclose generating one-time challenge phrases because, according to Applicant, Hattori does not disclose how the specified text is generated, and because the password is not random (pages 1-2 of the present response). However, even assuming arguendo that the above assertions are correct, Higgins was relied upon for disclosure of a database having a plurality of words and language rules for randomly generating one-time challenge phrases where each word of the phrase is randomly generated, as claimed.

Further with respect to Higgins, Applicant argues that the speech material in Higgins only includes 24 phrases from which the prompted phrases are selected, but that Higgins does not disclose generation of phrases wherein each word of the phrase is randomly generated (pages 2-3 of the present response). Applicant specifically states that Higgins teaches "that it is only from these 24 phrases that an individual will be asked to utter a phrase for verification purposes" (page 3 of the present response) but provides no evidence whatsoever in support of this statement. Further, the Examiner respectfully submits that this is an incorrect interpretation of the disclosures of Higgins. In particular, although Higgins does disclose that enrollment of a user requires speaking 24 phrases of three two-digit numbers each (page 90, section 2), Higgins does not disclose that the phrases generated for subsequent verification sessions must be selected from the 24 phrases that the user enrolled with. Rather, Higgins discloses that the prompted phrases are generated at random from the entire possible set of 56^3=175,616 phrases. In particular, Higgins states that there are 56^3 phrases and that "A verification trial or session consists of four such phrases" (page 90, section 2). This clearly does not limit the prompted phrases for the verification sessions to be selected from a subset of the phrases; rather, any of the 175,616 can be generated at random for verification trials. Again, this is further supported by the description in Higgins of how verification is performed, as detailed in the previous Office action (see Higgins, page 92, section 3.3.1, second paragraph; page 91, section 3.2, second paragraph; and pages 95-97, section 3.4). Higgins therefore discloses nothing to suggest that only the 24 phrases used in enrollment can be used in subsequent verification trials.

Applicant further argues that modifying Hattori "to include the random phrase generation of Higgins would mean that an individual would be required to speak a 'specified text' that is selected from one of 24 prerecorded phrases" and that because of this the proposed modification would not result in the claimed structure (pages 3-4 of the present response). First, as noted above, Higgins does not disclose that only the 24 phrases used for enrollment can be used for verification, but that any phrase from the vocabulary, i.e. the set of 56^3 possible phrases, can be generated at random for a given verification trial. Further, in response to applicant's argument that modifying Hattori would mean requiring a user to speak a specified text from prerecorded phrases, the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981). Applicant additionally argues that modifying Hattori to process the entire signal for speaker and speech recognition, as taught by Higgins, would change the principle of operation of Hattori, allegedly because it "would eliminate the teaching of Hattori of combining two types of verification together" noting that Hattori teaches text (or speech) verification and speaker verification (page 4 of the present response). However, because Higgins also discloses performing both speaker recognition (i.e. speaker verification) and speech recognition (see Higgins, pages 92-95, section 3.3. "Verification", as previously cited, where it is determined whether the claimant was speaking, i.e. speaker recognition is performed, and whether the input utterance was spoken as prompted, i.e. speech recognition is performed to determine whether the exact challenge phrase was spoken), it is not clear how the teaching in Higgins of performing both speech recognition and speaker recognition could eliminate Hattori's use of text verification and speaker verification. The systems of Hattori and Higgins each use both speech (or text) recognition and speaker recognition, and therefore Applicant's argument that this would change the principle of operation of Hattori is not appreciated.

Applicant further argues that the challenge phrases in Higgins cannot be one-time challenge phrases because there is a possible set of 175,616 phrases and "a one-time challenge phrase is defined as one that does not repeat" (page 5 of the present response). However, the Examiner notes that Applicant has not explicitly defined "one-time challenge phrase" in the present specification. Further, for there to be a guarantee that a phrase will never be repeated, there must be an infinite number of possible phrases; otherwise, there will always be some finite probability that a phrase could be repeated. It is well-known that, for purposes of security, any random number to be used as a one-time challenge (and, by various encoding schemes, including, without limitation, ASCII and Unicode, any phrase can be represented as a number) is considered to be sufficiently "one-time" or secure as long as the probability of a value repeating is sufficiently low. For example, see Menezes, Handbook of Applied Cryptography (in particular, section 10.3.1, pages 397-400, and more specifically, remark 10.11, page 399). This matches what is described in Higgins, where, for security, "prompts [i.e. challenge phrases] should be chosen at random from a large number of possibilities" (Higgins, page 89, section 1, first paragraph) and that an imposter cannot know in advance the phrase that will be prompted (Higgins, page 90, section 2). Additionally, it is noted that Applicant's specification also discloses a limited number of possible phrases (see, for example, page 11, lines 9-12, of the specification as originally filed, where a minimum of 1000 phrases are used). As Applicant contemplated a smaller number of phrases than that disclosed by Higgins, it appears that Applicant's assertion that a one-time challenge phrase does not repeat also contradicts the present specification.

Applicant also argues that Higgins shows enrollment using specific words and that "Applicant does not require specific words or text for speaker recognition enrollment or verification" (page 6 of the present response). However, it is noted that the claims recite no

requirements relating to enrollment of users and therefore they do not exclude using specific words for enrollment.

Applicant again states that Hattori does not describe how the specified text is generated (page 6 of the present response); however, again, it is noted that Higgins was relied upon for disclosure of a database having a plurality of words and language rules for randomly generating one-time challenge phrases where each word of the phrase is randomly generated, as claimed. Applicant also repeats that Higgins "selects 1 of 24 previously programmed phrases" and also argues that "the previously programmed phrases... do not constitute a plurality of words and language rules" (page 6 of the present response). However, first, it is again noted that there is nothing in Higgins that limits challenge phrases to the 24 phrases used for enrollment, as detailed above, and second, at least Higgins does discloses a database having a plurality of words and language rules for randomly generating one-time challenge phrases as claimed (see Higgins, page 90, section 2, as previously cited, where phrases are generated at random, from a plurality of words, i.e. the two-digit numbers, subject to syntactic constraints, i.e. based on language rules).

Regarding independent Claims 2, 4, 5, 16, and 17, and the claims depending therefrom, Applicant generally refers back to and/or repeats the arguments presented with respect to independent Claim 1 (see pages 6-8 of the present response), which have been addressed above.

Regarding dependent Claim 18, Applicant again argues that Hattori does not disclose a plurality of words and language rules in a plurality of language sets as claimed, based on the allegation that Hattori only discloses a specific text of "December the twenty-fifth" (see page 8 of the present response, citing Hattori, column 9, lines 63-64). However, the Examiner submits that additional portions of Hattori do disclose the plurality of words and rules in a plurality of language sets as claimed (see, for example, Hattori, column 9, lines 19-47; column 8, line 65-column 9, line 5; column 9, lines 61-64, words and phrases in English; see also column 11, lines 18-37, disclosing use of Japanese language; the two languages are clearly different language sets having different words and rules).